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Calwell: Can the Application of Laches Violate the Separation of Powers?:

CAN THE APPLICATION OF LACHES VIOLATE
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS?: A
SURPRISING ANSWER FROM A COPYRIGHT
CIRCUIT SPLIT
I. INTRODUCTION
Because all equitable terms tend to be softly defined and loosely used, a
certain amount of confusion results.1
On January 27, 2010, the separation of powers doctrine got primetime television coverage when President Obama openly criticized a
recent Supreme Court decision2 during the State of the Union address.3
Prefacing his comments by giving “due deference to separation of
powers”4 and standing only a few feet away from members of the
Supreme Court, the President outlined what he perceived to be the dire
consequences of the Court’s wrongly-decided opinion. Supreme Court
Justices are expected to sit silently and refrain from reacting to the
President’s speech,5 but Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. shook his head in
disgust and “appeared to mouth the words ‘not true.’”6 Here, viewers

1
1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION 104 (2d
ed. 1993).
2
The President criticized Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010),
which held that the ban in 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006) on corporate expenditures in elections
violated the First Amendment. Id. at 913.
3
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets Rare Rebuke, in Front of a Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2010, at A12.
4
Id. The separation of powers doctrine refers to the principle that the United States
Government is separated into three distinct and independent branches: executive,
legislative, and judicial. U.S. CONST. art. I (granting legislative powers to a Congress
consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. II (vesting the
executive power in a President of the United States); U.S. CONST. art. III (vesting the judicial
power of the United States in “one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”). See also 16A AM. JUR. 2D
Constitutional Law § 246 (2010). “[I]t is generally recognized that constitutional restraints
are overstepped where one department of government attempts to exercise powers
exclusively delegated to another, and that officers of any branch of the government may
not usurp or exercise the powers of either of the others.” Id. This doctrine is a central
feature of the federal government, and the Supreme Court emphasized “[t]his separation is
not merely a matter of convenience or of governmental mechanism. Its object is basic and
vital, namely, to preclude a commingling of these essentially different powers of
government in the same hands.” O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 526, 530 (1933)
(citation omitted).
5
Quinn Bowman, Criticism of President by Justice Is as Rare as Criticism of Court
During SOTU, PBS Newshour, Mar. 11, 2010, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/
2010/03/coyle-criticism-of-president-by-justice-is-rare.html.
6
Liptak, supra note 3.
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watched as the executive branch of government castigated the judicial
branch, all in front of an applauding legislative branch. For those
interested in the history of the separation of powers doctrine, this was
high drama.
While it is unlikely that we will ever see the President of the United
States giving an impassioned speech about the abuse of laches, the
equitable remedy is raising separation of powers concerns in the area of
copyright law. Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh Circuit calls the
idea that laches could ever be in tension with the separation of powers
doctrine “odd.”7 Four out of five circuits in a copyright circuit split
disagree.8 The Fourth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits cite the
7
Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust of Ill. v. Gorman Bros. Ready Mix, 283 F.3d 877,
881 (7th Cir. 2002). Judge Posner writes that “just as various tolling doctrines can be used
to lengthen the period for suit specified in a statute of limitations, so laches can be used to
contract it.” Id. Posner notes that other courts have taken a different approach to laches.
Id. “We are mindful that some courts have invoked a presumption against the use of laches
to shorten the statute of limitations.” Id. (citing Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. &
Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 321 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 264 F.3d
1195, 1207–08 (10th Cir. 2001); Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 799 (4th
Cir. 2001)). “One even made the presumption conclusive . . . on the odd ground that
abridging a statutory period for suit by means of a judge-made doctrine is in tension with
the separation of powers.” Id. (citing Ivani Contracting Corp. v. City of New York, 103 F.3d
257, 259–61 (2d Cir. 1997)). Although Gorman Bros. dealt with a statute that did not contain
an express federal statute of limitations, Posner’s discussion suggests that using laches to
shorten either an express or a borrowed statute of limitations would be proper. Id.
8
See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing each circuit’s position in the copyright circuit split).
Support for the notion that a court’s exercise of equitable discretion could be in tension
with the separation of powers comes from Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in a 1995
case before the Supreme Court. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131–32 (1995) (Thomas,
J., concurring). Discussing the judiciary’s equitable powers in a school desegregation plan,
Thomas writes, “Two clear restraints on the use of the equity power—federalism and the
separation of powers—derive from the very form of our Government.” Id. at 131.
Although the case before the Court did not present a situation where one branch of
government infringed on the rights of another, Justice Thomas recognized the possibility
that a court’s equitable powers could violate the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 132.
Justice Thomas writes:
The separation of powers imposes additional restraints on the
judiciary's exercise of its remedial powers. To be sure, this is not a case
of one branch of Government encroaching on the prerogatives of
another, but rather of the power of the Federal Government over the
States. Nonetheless, what the federal courts cannot do at the federal
level they cannot do against the States; in either case, Article III courts
are constrained by the inherent constitutional limitations on their
powers. There simply are certain things that courts, in order to remain
courts, cannot and should not do.
Id. Thomas goes on to discuss the history of the judiciary’s equitable powers in his
criticism of structural injunctions. Id. at 104–05. Thomas notes that the “Framers
approached equity with suspicion.” Id. at 105. After surveying the history of equity,
Thomas concludes:
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separation of powers doctrine as either a restraint or a complete bar on a
court’s ability to use laches to shorten the express federal statute of
limitations found in the Copyright Act of 1976.9 Circuit courts that ban
or restrict laches due to separation of powers concerns reason that setting
time limitations for copyright claims is the exclusive province of
Congress, and when a court shortens a statute of limitations with an
equitable remedy such as laches, the court oversteps its powers.10 In
other words, when the judicial branch uses laches to bar a statutorily
timely claim, they are essentially amending the Copyright Act, which is
an action reserved for legislators.
Is the equitable defense of laches the “golden girl” of equity or a
judicial power grab?11 If courts use the judicially-created doctrine to cut
short an explicit statute of limitations, are they simply exercising their
traditional equitable powers to tailor fair relief, or are they violating the
separation of powers doctrine which allocates different powers to the
executive, judicial, and legislative branches?12
that there is no early record of the exercise of broad remedial powers.
Certainly there were no “structural injunctions” issued by the federal
courts, nor were there any examples of continuing judicial supervision
and management of governmental institutions. Such exercises of
judicial power would have appeared to violate principles of state
sovereignty and of the separation of powers as late in the day as the
turn of the century.
Id. at 130. This discussion seems contrary to Posner’s view that it is “odd” to suggest that
an equitable remedy could be in tension with the separate of powers doctrine. See supra
note 7 (discussing Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust of Ill. v. Gorman Bros. Ready Mix,
283 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2002)). Thomas’s review of history reveals that maintaining the
separation of powers and being mindful of the principles of Federalism are very real
concerns in equity jurisprudence.
9
See Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2001); Chirco v.
Crosswinds Cmtys. Inc., 474 F.3d 227 (6th Cir. 2007); Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d
936 (10th Cir. 2002); Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d
1287 (11th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit does not mention the separation of powers
doctrine in Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2001). See supra note 4 for a
discussion of the separation of powers doctrine.
10
See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the reasoning in Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh
Circuit decisions).
11
Gail L. Heriot, A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of Limitation and the Doctrine of
Laches, 1992 BYU L. REV. 917, 918. “Contrast the statute of limitations with the doctrine of
laches, that golden girl of equity jurisdiction.” Id.
12
See Leandra Lederman, Equity and the Article I Court: Is the Tax Court’s Exercise of
Equitable Powers Constitutional?, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 357, 375–78 (2001) (discussing the equitable
powers of Article I courts and the doctrine of separation of powers). The separation of
powers is a constitutional doctrine concerning the divisions and balances between the roles
of the legislature, executive branch, and judiciary. Id. A violation of the doctrine occurs
when one branch assumes too much power or gives away too much of its power to another
co-equal branch. Id. at 363. See generally TOM CAMPBELL, SEPARATION OF POWERS IN
PRACTICE (2004) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of each branch of
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Conflicting answers to these questions can be found both inside and
outside the copyright context.13 There is confusion in federal courts as to
whether the equitable defense of laches may be used in various areas of
the law to shorten statutes of limitations without violating the separation
of powers doctrine.14 While a Supreme Court decision is sorely needed
to provide guidance regarding the operation of laches and express
statutes of limitation generally,15 an Amendment to the Copyright Act is
the best solution to the current copyright circuit split.16 The
government and analyzing which branch of government is most appropriate to handle
certain disputes). Campbell summarizes the power of the doctrine as well as the dangers of
its abuse:
The American system of government separates power. It thereby
achieves protection for its citizens against the potential of tyranny.
The separation also can call forth advantages that each branch
possesses for the efficient disposition of issues of public policy and
private dispute and to enhance the public’s confidence in the fairness
of the process that led to those dispositions. In a government with no
formal separation, a sacrifice is necessarily made of at least some of
these advantages. A danger exists also, however, of too severe a
separation. Where one branch fails to undertake a task for which it is
the best suited, it willingly permits another branch to usurp that
authority. The consequences often include a compromise in the
efficiency of the branch assuming the power from the branch giving it
up.
Id. at 1.
13
See infra Parts II.C.1–2 (discussing cases both inside and outside the copyright circuit
split that hold conflicting positions on the issue of when laches may operate to shorten a
statute of limitations).
14
See infra Part II.C (discussing the use of laches in various areas of the law).
15
For the argument that the application of laches violates the separation of powers
doctrine and that a Supreme Court decision is the best solution to the split of authority see
Ryan Christopher Locke, Note, Resetting the Doomsday Clock: Is it Constitutional for Laches to
Bar Copyright Infringement Claims Within the Statute of Limitations?, 6 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
133, 153, 156 (2008−2009). See also Misty Kathryn Nall, Note, (In) Equity in Copyright Law:
The Availability of Laches to Bar Copyright Infringement Claims, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 325, 346
(2008) (arguing that laches should be banned in copyright cases because the application of
the equitable remedy within the statute of limitations impermissibly “circumvents the
federal statute” and violates the separation of powers doctrine).
16
See infra Part IV (offering a proposed amendment to the Copyright Act that would
standardize laches analysis in copyright claims); infra Part II.C (discussing the guidance
offered by the United States Supreme Court regarding the application of the equitable
defense of laches). For the argument that separation of powers concerns are “only
marginal at best” in copyright law, see Vikas K. Didwania, Note, The Defense of Laches in
Copyright Infringement Claims, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227, 1257 (2008). In part, Didwania
reasons that a statute of limitations functions as only a maximum time limitation and not a
guaranteed minimum time period in which to file. Id. at 1245. In other words, “It is
unclear why just because a statute of limitations grants a plaintiff up to three years means it
must also always grant a plaintiff at least three years.” Id. Contra 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation
of Actions § 8 (2010). “A statute of limitations signifies a fixed period within which an
action may be brought to preserve a right . . . .” Id. See also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN
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consequences of the circuit split are illustrated by the following
hypothetical.17
Imagine you are a small business owner whose arts and crafts store
is struggling. One Halloween, you overhear customers complaining
about the lack of decent children’s costumes available for the holiday. In
an attempt to boost revenue, you design a series of costumes and rent
them out from your shop. The costumes are a huge success. Each year,
you invest more in advertising and your rental business grows. In your
eleventh and most profitable year of renting costumes, you are shocked
when you are sued for copyright infringement. The creator of a
children’s cartoon alleges that one of your costumes infringes one of its
copyrighted characters. Outraged, you learn that the copyright holder
has known about your costumes for the past ten years. Can she sit back
and watch for a decade as you build a successful business and sue you
just when your profits peak? Isn’t there a remedy that protects
defendants from such gross delay?
The answer is that laches is the defense you seek, but its viability
depends on the circuit. If you are sued in the Fourth Circuit, laches is
unavailable.18 The statute of limitations will be calculated from the time
of the most recent costume rental, and the plaintiff’s claim will be
timely.19 However, if you are in the Ninth Circuit, laches is available to
potentially stop the lawsuit.20 If the costumes never substantially
changed, the court will calculate the laches period from the very first
rental and will likely hold that the plaintiff who waited ten years to sue
unreasonably delayed filing her claim.21 In sum, laches cannot help you
in the Fourth Circuit, but in the Ninth Circuit, it just might save your
business.
AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 7 (3d ed. 2002). “The conventional statute of
limitations creates a fixed time in which suit must be filed. Time begins to run when the
cause of action accrues, and the suit is barred when time runs out. It is possible to precisely
identify the very last day on which suit can be filed.” Id. (emphasis added). If statutes of
limitations function only as maximum time limits and do not also protect a clearly-defined
time in which a plaintiff may decide to file, due process concerns arise, especially in cases
that do not involve continuing wrongs. See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 115–16, n.1 (noting that
one key element of due process is “standards that can be known in advance”).
17
The contents of this hypothetical are loosely based on the facts of Lyons P’ship v.
Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that laches does not apply
to copyright claims within the statutory period). However, the facts have been altered and
all names and characters are purely fictional.
18
Lyons, 243 F.3d at 798.
19
See id.
20
Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that laches may bar
relief, including prospective injunctive relief, where the feared future infringements are
identical to the alleged past infringements).
21
See id.
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This Note focuses on the conflicting approaches courts take to laches
in copyright claims and briefly discusses cases outside the copyright
context to highlight the fact that the use of laches is raising separation of
powers concerns in other areas of the law.22 Part II examines the
background of equity jurisprudence, the defense of laches, statutes of
limitations, and the Copyright Act.23 Part III analyzes three possible
resolutions to the copyright circuit split and examines to what extent
each solution resolves separation of powers concerns and furthers the
goals of the Copyright Act.24 Part IV argues that laches should be
available as a defense in copyright claims and proposes an amendment
to the Copyright Act that combines the approaches of the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits.25
II. BACKGROUND
Few American citizens, however, would think of
themselves in court as humble petitioners, on their knees
before the judge who may deny relief on grounds that cannot
be stated as principles or applied even-handedly to all
suitors . . . . So a full-blown discretion in the chancellor to
deny relief may be hard to reconcile with the ideal of rights
under the law.26
It may be shocking to the average American to learn that when a
judge rules on an equitable defense such as laches, she is ruling with
powers inherited from a time when begging before an authoritative
bishop in court was commonplace.27 The discretion available in equity
might be particularly alarming when it is applied to a right firmly

See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.C.
24
See infra Part III.
25
See infra Part IV.
26
DOBBS, supra note 1, at 115–16.
27
Id. Dobbs noted that the broad equitable discretion available in the original courts of
equity are contrary to our modern concept of courts:
The chancellor’s discretion to deny relief is a peculiar tradition to
encounter in a democratic society where citizens possess rights under
the law, not merely the hope of indulgence. The chancellor–bishop’s
discretion to refuse enforcement of established rights may have
seemed normal in 16th century England. He was an authoritative
bishop who gave relief as a matter of grace and discretion to
individuals who were subjects of the Crown, not citizens of a
democracy.
Id. at 115.
22
23
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established by the Constitution, such as copyright protection.28 When
addressing an issue concerning copyright infringement, it is imperative
to note at the outset the importance the United States Constitution places
on an individual’s right to protect intellectual property.29
An interesting bit of trivia about the United States Constitution is
that the term “right” is used only once in the entire document as ratified
in 1787—in the copyright clause.30 In Article I, Section eight, Congress
has the power to protect authors and inventors by securing their
“exclusive Right” to writings and discoveries.31 By grant of this
constitutional authority, Congress first set out to protect intellectual
property with the Copyright Act of 1790, and the act now in effect is the
Copyright Act of 1976 (“Act” or “Copyright Act”).32

28
See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text (discussing the importance the founders
placed on the right to protect intellectual property).
29
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Constitution states that Congress has the power “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Id.
30
Id. See also Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2246 (2008). The fact that the word
“right” is only used once in the eight articles of the Constitution is mentioned in a case
before the Court concerning prisoners. Id. Considering the rights of Guantanamo
detainees, the Court points to the specificity used in the Suspension Clause as evidence of
the Framers’ intent to establish the writ of habeus corpus as a “vital” protection of liberty.
Id. The Court applies this reasoning to the Copyright context and notes that the Copyright
Clause contains the only use of the word “right” in the entire ratified document. Id. For a
discussion of an intent–based approach to interpreting the copyright clause see Ralph
Oman, The Copyright Clause: “A Charter For a Living People,” 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 99, 103
(1987).
31
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
32
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2006). For a basic discussion of previous Copyright Acts and
subsequent amendments see PAUL GOLDSTEIN & R. ANTHONY REESE, COPYRIGHT, PATENT,
TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 648, 649−50 (6th ed. 2008). See also MARSHALL
LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 6–15 (3d ed., 1999). Leaffer notes that before
any copyright act existed in America, the colonies had their own forms of copyright laws.
Id. at 6. The Framers of the Constitution placed the Copyright Clause in the document
because they recognized a need for uniformity in copyright and patent law. Id. Congress
passed the first copyright act in 1790, and modeled it on the English Statute of Anne which
gave authors protection of their maps, charts and books for two fourteen year terms. Id. at
7. The second federal copyright law came with the Copyright Act of 1909 (“1909 Act”) after
President Theodore Roosevelt called for a revision of copyright law to keep pace with
modern conditions. Id. An important change in the 1909 Act was that protection was
expanded to “all the writings of an author.” Id. The 1909 Act also expanded the amount of
time a copyrighted work could be protected. Id. 7–8. The law imposed two twenty-eight
year terms, with the second term as a renewal term which allowed for the option to protect
the work for fifty-six years. Id. The current Copyright Act protects material that was fixed
in a tangible form on or after January 1, 1978, for the life of the author plus seventy years.
17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006).
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One of the issues courts face when interpreting the Copyright Act
concerns the length of time plaintiffs have to bring a claim. 33 Circuits are
split as to whether a plaintiff may be time-barred by the equitable
doctrine of laches before the statute has run.34
At first glance, the split appears to be a relatively simple one with
the Fourth Circuit as the only circuit supporting a flat ban on the
application of laches to claims filed within three years of a copyright
violation.35 The Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits vary as to the
Doctrine of Laches May be Used to Reduce Limitations Period in Some Copyright Suits, 75
U.S.L.W. 1420 (Jan. 23, 2007) (highlighting a circuit split over whether laches is available as
an affirmative defense under the Copyright Act). The express statute of limitations has
created a circuit split regarding its application in a civil action. Id. See 17 U.S.C. § 507
(2006). The Act provides an express statute of limitations for both civil and criminal
actions. Id. The Act states, “Except as expressly provided otherwise in this title, no
criminal proceeding shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is
commenced within 5 years after the cause of action arose.” Id. § 507(a). For civil actions,
the statute provides, “No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title
unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.” Id. § 507(b). Despite
the apparent simplicity of a three–year statute of limitations, the provision has caused a
circuit split. Doctrine of Laches, supra. See also BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE:
THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN DREAM 76 (2006). President Barack Obama notes
that even the simplest of provisions in a statute can cause an enormous amount of
controversy. Id. Obama writes:
The simplest statute—a requirement, say, that companies provide
bathroom breaks to their hourly workers—can become the subject of
wildly different interpretations, depending on whom you are talking
to: the congressman who sponsored the provision, the staffer who
drafted it, the department head whose job it is to enforce it, the lawyer
whose client finds it inconvenient, or the judge who may be called
upon to apply it.
Id. Obama goes on to note that controversy over a simple clause in a statute is, in part, due
to the separation of powers. Id. at 76–77.
Some of this is by design, a result of the complex machinery of checks
and balances. The diffusion of power between the branches, as well as
between federal and state governments, means that no law is ever
final, no battle truly finished; there is always the opportunity to
strengthen or weaken what appears to be done, to water down a
regulation or block its implementation, to contract an agency’s power
with a cut in its budget, or to seize control of an issue where a vacuum
has been left.
Id.
34
Doctrine of Laches, supra note 33.
35
Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that
laches does not apply to copyright claims within the statutory period). See Dylan Ruga,
Comment, The Role of Laches in Closing the Door on Copyright Infringement Claims, 29 NOVA L.
REV. 663, 684–85 (2005) (arguing that because the Supreme Court holds that equitable
defenses may not be applied to legal remedies, the only viable solution to the copyright
circuit split is to allow the defense of laches to bar only equitable relief); Jason R. Swartz,
Comment, When the Door Closes Early: Laches as an Affirmative Defense to Claims of Copyright
Infringement, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1457, 1474–78 (2008) (arguing that the Sixth Circuit’s
33
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application of the equitable defense, but all hold that laches is available
in certain circumstances.36 However, upon closer inspection, the circuit
split is more complicated than a lone circuit with a position contrary to
the majority.37 The circuit split reveals a deeper divide regarding the
role of laches and the separation of powers doctrine generally.38
Below, Part II.A discusses the major policy objectives behind
copyright law as well as the origins and provisions of the Copyright Act
of 1976.39 Part II.B contains an overview of the equitable defense of
laches.40 Part II.C introduces the argument raised by some circuits that
the application of laches can violate the separation of powers doctrine
and explores where the circuits stand on the issue both inside and
outside the context of the Copyright Act.41
A. The Copyright Act of 1976
Two main objectives of copyright law are to reward creators for their
labor and to serve the public good by encouraging the production of
original work.42 First, one justification for protecting intellectual
approach is the best balance between the Fourth Circuit’s ban on laches as an affirmative
defense and the Ninth Circuit’s liberal approach).
36
Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1321–22
(11th Cir. 2008) (holding that laches may bar only retrospective damages in extraordinary
circumstances); Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys. Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 236 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding
that laches may bar relief within the statutory period when relief sought will create an
unjust hardship on the defendants or on innocent third parties); Jacobsen v. Deseret Book
Co., 287 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that laches may cut short a statute of limitations
in rare cases); Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
laches may bar relief, including prospective injunctive relief, where the feared future
infringements are identical to the alleged past infringements).
37
While the Fourth Circuit is the only court to completely ban the application of laches
within the statute of limitations period because of separation of powers concerns, the Sixth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits allow laches only in unusual circumstances and agree that the
application of the doctrine raises separation of powers concerns. See Peter Letterese, 533
F.3d at 1321–22; Chirco, 474 F.3d at 236; Jacobsen, 287 F.3d at 936; Lyons P’ship, 243 F.3d at
798;. The Ninth Circuit is the only court to exclude separation of powers principles from
laches analysis. See Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 959–60.
38
See supra note 4 (explaining the basic concept of the separation of powers doctrine).
39
See infra Part II.A (discussing policy, provisions, and history of the Copyright Act).
40
See infra Part II.B (discussing the history of law and equity and the equitable defense
of laches).
41
See infra Part II.C (discussing separation of powers concerns and approaches used in
laches analysis both inside and outside the copyright circuit split).
42
18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright and Literary Property § 2 (2010) (citing Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975)). “While the immediate effect of the copyright
law is to secure a fair return for an author's creative labor, the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.” Id. Further,
copyright law creates “incentives for development, with dissemination, which seeks to
foster learning, progress, and development.” Id.
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property is that each person has a right to be compensated for her
labor.43 For example, it would be unjust for an author to write a book
that becomes famous world-wide, yet leaves the writer uncompensated
for her contribution to knowledge or for her artful expression.44 Second,
the literal goal of copyright law as stated in the Constitution is to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” and the broad
purpose is to serve the public good.45 The idea is that copyright law
encourages individuals to introduce their creations into the market and
thereby share them with the public, increasing the welfare of all.46
Arguably, the founders designed the copyright clause as an incentive to
ensure that the public welfare will always be enriched by the creations of
individuals.47 The design of the first copyright statute in the United
States was similar to an English copyright statute, the Statute of Anne.48
United States copyright law finds its origins in fifteenth century
England with the founding of the printing press at Westminster.49 After
the founding of the press, the Crown issued patents for printing to
control the newly generated materials.50 These patents served not only
as mechanisms to prevent infringement of other licensed works, but also
as censorship tools to control “seditious matter.”51
Censorship
LEAFFER, supra note 32, at 16–17 (citing JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT Ch. 5 (1960) (1690)). Leaffer notes that the concept of a person’s moral right
to “reap the fruits of his or her own labor” is based on natural law philosophy. Id. Leaffer
points to John Locke, a famous natural law proponent, who posited that people own their
bodies, the labor of their bodies and the fruits of that labor. Id. at 17.
44
See id.
45
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994). The
Fogerty Court stated:
More importantly, the policies served by the Copyright Act are more
complex, more measured, than simply maximizing the number of
meritorious suits for copyright infringement . . . . We have often
recognized the monopoly privileges that Congress has authorized,
while “intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors by the provision of a special reward,” are limited in nature
and must ultimately serve the public good.
Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984)).
46
18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright and Literary Property § 2 (2008).
47
Id. “Thus, copyright policy is meant to balance protection, which seeks to ensure a fair
return to authors and inventors and thereby to establish incentives for development, with
dissemination, which seeks to foster learning, progress, and development.” Id. See also Tim
Hering, Comment, Users and Abusers: Has the Distinction Been Legislated out of Copyright, 83
OR. L. REV. 1349, 1351 (2004) (citing CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW § 1.03[A] (6th ed.
2003)).
48
GOLDSTEIN & REESE, supra note 32, at 648; Statute of Anne, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
49
GOLDSTEIN & REESE, supra note 32, at 648.
50
Id.
51
Id.
43
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ultimately declined in the seventeenth century, and Parliament passed
the first copyright act in 1709.52
In America, Congress enacted the first federal copyright statute in
1790.53 Like the Statute of Anne, the 1790 statute provided for a
fourteen-year term that was renewable if the author was still living.54 If
any person “printed, reprinted, published, or imported from any foreign
kingdom or state, any copy of copies of such map, chart, book or books,
without the consent of the author or proprietor thereof, first had and
obtained in writing, signed in the presence of two or more credible
witnesses” they were subject to a fine of fifty cents for each infringing
sheet found in that person’s possession.55 Additionally, to obtain
protection, the author had to file a copy of the work with the clerk of the
court and pay sixty cents for the registration.56 The original statute
allowed the author one year to file a cause of action for infringement.57
The purpose for the current statute of limitations in the Copyright
Act is to prevent forum shopping among circuits and create uniformity
in the courts. 58 Prior to 1957, versions of the Act did not contain a
uniform statute of limitations, and courts borrowed analogous state
statutes of limitations for torts and applied them to copyright claims.59
As a result, limitations periods varied widely from state to state.60 To
eliminate forum shopping, Congress enacted Section 507(b) of the
Id. The statute provided authors with a once-renewable term of fourteen years and
contained penalties for infringement. Id.; Statute of Anne, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
53
Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
54
Id.
55
Id. According to an economic history services website created by Samuel H.
Williamson, Professor of Economics, Emeritus, from Miami University, fifty cents in 1790 is
worth twelve dollars and eleven cents in 2010 (using the Consumer Price Index).
http://measuringworth.com/index.html (follow “Relative Values - US $” hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 13, 2010). The registration fee today for a basic claim in an original work of
authorship
ranges
from
thirty-five
dollars
to
sixty-five
dollars.
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/fees.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
56
Act of May 31, 1790.
57
Id.
58
John E. Theuman, Annotation, Construction and Application of 17 U.S.C.A. § 507(b),
Requiring That Civil Copyright Action be Commenced Within 3 Years After Claim Accrued, 140
A.L.R. FED. 641, § 2(a) (1997). Some federal courts used the state statute of limitations for
torts and others used the limitations period for actions such as conversion, contracts, or
trover. Id. Theuman notes that this resulted in a “wide divergence of time limits for filing
suit” which resulted in forum shopping. Id. To resolve the disparity and eliminate the
problem, Congress set the federal statute of limitations at three years after the cause of
action accrues. Id. See also Swartz, supra note 35, at 1462–63 (discussing the history of the
Copyright Act and arguing that the Sixth Circuit’s approach to the copyright split is the
best to resolve the controversy).
59
Theuman, supra note 58, § 2(a).
60
Id.
52
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Copyright Act which mandates that a copyright holder must file within
three years after the claim accrues.61
Courts vary, however, as to when a claim accrues.62 If a jurisdiction
uses a discovery rule, then a claim accrues when a litigant knows or
should have known of the infringement.63 If a jurisdiction uses an injury
rule, then the claim accrues when the infringement actually occurs,
regardless of the plaintiff’s knowledge.64 Some courts view a series of
infringing acts as one “continuing wrong.”65 In cases of continuing
wrongs, the three-year statute of limitations begins to run at the time of
the most recent of those acts.66 Liability attaches to all acts of
infringement, including infringements that occurred more than three
years prior to filing suit.67 Other courts reject the continuing wrong
theory and assess damages only for those infringements that occurred
during the three years prior to filing.68 Once an infringement is
established, the Copyright Act affords copyright holders a wide variety
of remedies.69
61
17 U.S.C. § 507. In criminal proceedings, a claim must be “commenced within five
years after the cause of action arose.” Id. § 507(a). However, the statute provides that “[n]o
civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced
within three years after the claim accrued.” Id. § 507 (b). See 1 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 12.05 (2008) (identifying that this “spare formulation” regarding accrual
presents a “host of problems”).
62
Theuman, supra note 58, § 2(a).
63
NIMMER, supra note 61, § 12.05(B)(2). See Heriot, supra note 11, at 926. Despite
Congress’s intent, the goal of creating uniformity through a statute of limitations has not
been entirely successful due the different ways courts handle the question of when a claim
accrues. Id. Heriot argues that recent history has witnessed a convergence of statutes of
limitations and the equitable doctrine of laches. Id. at 967. Heriot attributes the melding of
the two doctrines to the methods courts treat discovery rules which “toll the
commencement of the limitations period when plaintiff is excusably unaware of his or her
cause of action.” Id. at 954. The author urges that courts that change rigid rules like
statutes of limitations into more flexible standards should be “viewed with suspicion in
part because they are increasing their own power.” Id. at 968. She notes the difficulty
legislatures would have in formulating a workable statute to penalize judges and restrict
their liberal treatment of statutes of limitations. Id. at 963.
64
Auscape Int’l v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 409 F. Supp. 2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (adopting
an injury rule for claim accrual in copyright infringement cases). The court looked to the
legislative history of the Copyright Act and reasoned that Congress intended a cause to
accrue the moment the infringement occurred, regardless of plaintiff’s knowledge. Id. at
245.
65
NIMMER, supra note 61, § 12.05(B)(1) (citing Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir.
1983)).
66
Theuman, supra note 58, § 3(a).
67
NIMMER, supra note 61, § 12.05(B)(1).
68
Id.
69
17 U.S.C. §§ 502–05 (2006) (providing for injunctions, impoundments and disposal of
infringing articles, infringer’s profits, costs and attorneys’ fees, seizure, forfeiture of the
infringing articles, actual and statutory damages).
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The Copyright Act provides a host of legal and equitable remedies,
and the nature of the remedy sought becomes relevant to the availability
of laches.70 The Act provides for injunctions,71 impounding and
disposition of infringing articles,72 damages and profits,73 costs and
attorney’s fees,74 and seizure and forfeiture.75 Some of the Act’s
remedies are legal, such as actual and statutory damages.76 Other
remedies provided by the Act are equitable, such as injunctions.77
Courts have traditionally used laches to bar only equitable remedies and
a statute of limitations to bar only legal relief.78 However, both inside
and outside the context of the Copyright Act, the application of laches is

Id. The Act provides for, inter alia, statutory damages and injunctions. Id. § 504. See
LAYCOCK, supra note 16 for a discussion of legal and equitable remedies. Damages are a
legal remedy and, in general, compensatory and punitive remedies are legal. Id.
Injunctions are one of “the most important” equitable remedies. Id. With exceptions,
Laycock classifies most legal remedies as substitutionary and most equitable remedies as
specific. Id. Laycock describes the distinction:
Remedies may be divided into two more basic categories: The most
fundamental remedial choice is between substitutionary and specific
remedies. With substitutionary remedies, plaintiff suffers harm and
receives a sum of money. Specific remedies seek to avoid this
exchange. They aspire to prevent harm, or undo it, rather than let it
happen and compensate for it. They seek to prevent harm to plaintiff,
repair the harm in kind, or restore the specific thing that plaintiff lost.
Id. at 6. See also Ruga, supra note 35, at 683. (citing Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local
No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990) and arguing that after the application of the
Supreme Court test established in Terry to each remedy to determine which are legal and
which are equitable in nature, laches should only be available to bar the equitable
remedies).
71
17 U.S.C. § 502 (2006).
72
Id. § 503.
73
Id. § 504.
74
Id. § 505.
75
Id. § 509.
76
LAYCOCK, supra note 16 (noting that damages are the most important legal remedy).
77
Id. (noting injunctions and specific performance decrees are the most important
equitable remedies).
78
See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 103. “When laches does not amount to estoppel or waiver,
it does not ordinarily bar legal claims, only equitable remedies.” Id. at 104. The traditional
function of the doctrine was to operate as a “flexible” statute of limitations barring delayed
claims where no statute of limitations existed. Id. Dobbs writes that, “This traditional
function suggests that laches should be limited to cases in which no statute of limitations
applies.” Id. But see A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1029–
30 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (citing Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Alexander, 614 F.2d 474, 478
(5th Cir. 1980) (noting that laches has been extended from suits in equity to suits at law and
has become “part of the general body of rules governing relief in the federal court
system”).
70
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not so simple.79 Below is an overview of the defense, its history, and its
elements.80
B. The Equitable Defense of Laches
Laches is an equitable defense which was historically only available
in courts of equity.81 In thirteenth and fourteenth century England,
courts were divided into courts of law and courts of equity.82 The
Chancellor, the second most powerful official next to the King, heard
claims in a court of equity and applied a set of rules, procedures, and
remedies that were separate from those applied in courts of law.83
Equity courts did not use statutes of limitations, and if a plaintiff’s delay
in coming to court was inexcusable or had caused prejudice to the
defendant, the Chancellor would bar relief according to the doctrine of
laches.84 Based on the maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas
See infra Part II.C (discussing separation of powers concerns and what approach is
used to laches analysis both inside and outside the copyright circuit context.). See also
LAYCOCK, supra note 16, at 1003 (noting confusion in the courts as to whether laches may
operate to shorten a statute of limitations). “When an equitable claim is subject to a statute
of limitations, laches is irrelevant unless it bars the claim before the limitations period
expires. . . . It is rare to bar a claim for laches before an applicable statute of limitations has
run on a one–time event; some cases say it just can’t happen.” Id.; see also County of Oneida
v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 244 n.16 (1985) (noting in dicta that the application
of laches in an action at law would be “novel”).
80
See infra Part II.B (discussing the history and elements of the equitable defense of
laches).
81
LAYCOCK, supra note 16, at 959. Laycock summarizes the pre-merger use of laches:
Before the merger of law and equity, equitable defenses were
recognized by the chancellors but not by the law courts. The
chancellors made some of these defenses available at law by enjoining
the opposing litigant from pursuing his claim; fraud is the prime
example. Other defenses, such as laches and unclean hands, were
available only in equity.
Since the merger of law and equity, the term equitable defenses has
had no very precise meaning. In common usage, it means those
defenses that were historically equitable and perhaps others similar to
them.
Id.
82
Id. at 7. See also Ruga, supra note 35, at 670–72 (summarizing the history of law and
equity in light of Supreme Court precedent and arguing that in modern American courts,
laches can defeat only equitable claims).
83
Ivani Contracting Corp. v. City of New York, 103 F.3d 257, 259 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting
that the Chancellor in Equity was called the “King’s Conscience”); Ruga, supra note 35, at
670–72 (noting that many considered the chancellor to be the “government’s leading moral
authority”) (quoting ROBERT N. LEAVELL ET AL., EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND
DAMAGES 1 (6th ed. 2000)).
84
Describing a plaintiff as “coming to court” in a 16th century equitable action may be
inaccurate. Heriot, supra note 11, at 926. “After all, during the reign of Henry VIII, the
79
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subvenit (equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights),85
laches is a flexible doctrine that has no fixed time for the barring of a
claim.86
The United States inherited the equitable defense of laches and the
dual law/equity court system from England, but merged the two in
1938. 87 This merger was due in part to American dissatisfaction with the
discretionary nature and power of equity courts.88 The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure created one action known as a civil action, giving the
federal courts both legal and equitable powers.89
When modern courts allow the defense of laches, the three elements
established by common law serve as a guide.90 First, the defendant must
show an unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiff before filing

typical, well informed individual might not have considered equity courts to be courts, just
as many persons during our time do not consider administrative agencies to be courts.” Id.
85
Ivani, 103 F.3d at 259.
86
Thomas G. Robinson, Note, Laches in Federal Substantive Law: Relation to Statutes of
Limitations, 56 B.U. L. REV. 970 (1976). “Because equitable relief is more a matter of grace
than of right and because historically equity had no statute of limitations, courts hearing
these claims evaluate the circumstances of the parties before deciding whether the plaintiff
should be barred from bringing his action.” Id. The flexibility inherent in equitable
defenses such as laches can arguably help a court more closely carry out the will of
Congress. See CAMPBELL, supra note 12, at 15. Campbell argues that courts’ equitable
powers are valuable methods for solving separation of powers issues. Id. Campbell argues
that the Supreme Court has restricted courts’ equitable powers too severely and an
opportunity to “benefit from an inherent judicial advantage” has been lost. Id.
87
FED. R. CIV. P. 2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2 merged equitable and legal actions
into one form of action known as “the civil action.” Id. The rule states, “There is one form
of action––the civil action.” Id.
88
Joseph H. Beale, Equity in America, 1 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 21, 22–23 (1921). Pre–merger,
equity was an unpopular “method of applying law,” and the equity courts were seen as
“royalist persons administering the law of an effete monarchy.” Id. See Edward Yorio, A
Defense of Equitable Defenses, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201 (1990). Further, the merger did not quell
all criticisms of the flexible equitable doctrines. Id. “The merger of courts of law and
equity has left an enduring legacy of debate about the survival of equitable doctrines in
merged judicial systems.” Id. One argument against equitable defenses is that historically
the English Chancellor was ecclesiastic and because of his religious background, he
adjudicated disputes on moral rather than legal principles. Id. at 1205–06. Since law and
equity merged, it is “indefensible” for a judge to apply different standards of morality
depending upon which type of claim she is deciding. Id. at 1206. See also Uisdean R. Vass
& Xia Chen, The Admiralty Doctrine of Laches, 53 LA. L. REV. 495 (1992). Vass and Chen
argue that criticism of the equitable doctrine of laches extends to the admiralty courts. Id.
at 523. The advent of a prescriptive period for maritime personal injury and death actions
may work against the equitable defense and result in less successful laches defenses. Id.
89
FED. R. CIV. P. 2.
90
LAYCOCK, supra note 16, at 998. “The essential elements of laches are well-defined by
common law.” Id.
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suit.91 Second, common law requires plaintiff’s awareness of the
infringement.92
Third, a reliance interest must result from the
defendant’s “continued development of goodwill” during the period of
delay.93 In other words, the defendant must show that she is prejudiced
as a result of plaintiff’s delay.94 Plaintiff’s delay is measured from the
time of the act of infringement on which the suit is based.95
Delay and prejudice take a variety of forms.96 Mere proof of delay in
bringing a suit is not enough to successfully establish a laches defense.97
Taking time to prepare a claim and evaluate the cost of litigation is an
example of a reasonable delay, but capitalizing on an infringer’s labor to
see if the endeavor will be profitable is an unreasonable delay.98 Judge
Learned Hand famously wrote that for a plaintiff to engage in this type
of delay is to “speculate without risk.”99 Prejudice to a defendant might
take the form of evidentiary loss like the death of witnesses or misplaced
documents.100 Prejudice can also take the form of economic loss when a
defendant continues to invest in a project, but might have acted
differently if a plaintiff would have pursued her claim promptly.101 This
fact-intensive, two-step laches analysis is unlike the application of a fixed
statute of limitations which simply requires the rigid application of a

Id. See also 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 125 (2008). Unreasonable delay is stated in some
courts as a lack of diligence or neglect and resulting prejudice is stated as “injury, injustice,
or condition, that results from the delay to the defending party.” Id. Further, courts may
apply laches if the delay was “negligent, unjustifiable, unreasonable or inexcusable, or
unconscionable.” Id.
92
LAYCOCK, supra note 16, at 998.
93
Id.
94
Id.; supra notes 96–101 and accompanying text (discussing prejudice and delay).
95
NIMMER, supra note 61, § 12.06 (B)(1).
96
Id. § 12.06 (B)(3). See Ruga, supra note 35, at 665–68 for a discussion of various
examples of prejudice and delay for the purposes of laches.
97
Gardner v. Panama R.R., 342 U.S. 29, 30–31 (1951).
98
Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
99
Id. Judge Learned Hand also noted the flexibility of equity and explained why delay
in a copyright claim is especially unjust:
Equity will control its peculiar remedy of an account of profits
according to its own sense of justice. It must be obvious to every one
[sic] familiar with equitable principles that it is inequitable for the
owner of a copyright, with full notice of an intended infringement, to
stand inactive while the proposed infringer spends large sums of
money in its exploitation, and to intervene only when his speculation
has proved a success. Delay under such circumstances allows the
owner to speculate without risk with the other's money; he cannot
possibly lose, and he may win.
Id.
100
NIMMER, supra note 61, § 12.05(B)(2).
101
Id.
91
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deadline.102 Below is a discussion of how statutes of limitations interact
with the defense of laches to create a possible tension with the separation
of powers doctrine.103
C. Laches, Statutes of Limitations, and the Separation of Powers
Unlike the doctrine of laches, which has no fixed time periods,
statutes of limitations establish clear deadlines.104 The benefits of rigid
time limits for claims, as opposed to discretionary equitable doctrines
like laches, is that a statute of limitations provides certainty and
predictability.105 However, the interaction of statutes of limitations and
the equitable defense of laches has not been certain or predictable since
the merger of law and equity.106 Pre-merger, the defense of laches was
available only in a court of equity, while a statute of limitations was
CAMPBELL, supra note 12 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of each branch
of government and analyzing which branch of government is most appropriate to handle
certain disputes); Heriot, supra note 11, at 926 (discussing the rule–based rigid qualities of
statutes of limitations compared to the flexibility of laches). Campbell notes that equity
affords courts the ability to fit statutes to difficult circumstances. CAMPBELL, supra note 12,
at 15.
A fundamental reason we have judges with broad discretion, rather
than ministerial magistrates applying legislatively set rules
unwaveringly, is because we recognize broad rules don’t always fit
specific circumstances . . . Congress could establish an absolute rule of
no retrospective application or an absolute rule of retrospective
application; but an absolute rule loses the advantage of individual
accommodation.
Id.
103
See supra Part II.C (comparing statutes of limitations with laches and discussing the
position some courts take that the operation of laches may violate separation of powers
principles).
104
Although the doctrine of laches and statutes of limitations are different, they share the
same goal of limiting the amount of time a plaintiff may bring a claim. See Heriot, supra
note 11, at 921. “They [doctrine of laches and the statute of limitations] are two differing
legal formulations designed to deal with the same underlying legal concern—that at some
point a plaintiff’s cause of action ought to perish for lack of timeliness.” Id.
105
Ivani Contracting Corp. v. City of New York, 103 F.3d 257, 259 (2d Cir. 1997).
106
LAYCOCK, supra note 16. Remedies are classified as legal or equitable, but the line
between them is “jagged and not especially functional” as a result of the bureaucratic “fight
for turf” that occurred when law and equity merged. Id. Laycock notes:
Where the law/equity distinction is especially murky, . . . lawyers
and judges tend to overlook it, and the distinction becomes less and
less important. Where the distinction is written into substantive law,
judges have trouble applying it. . . . Perhaps the proper lesson from
Mertens and Great-West is that courts and legislatures should quit using
law and equity as doctrinal or statutory categories.
Id. at 7–8 (citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993) and Great-West Life
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 122 S. Ct. 708 (2002) in which the Court produced different 54 splits on the meaning of “equitable remedies” in Congressional legislation).
102
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applied only in a court of law.107 In modern courts, the equitable
defenses of estoppel, waiver, and unconscionability are available
whether the relief plaintiff seeks is equitable or legal in nature.108 The
“conventional wisdom” is that the laches defense is only available if a
plaintiff seeks equitable relief.109 However, case law both inside and
outside the copyright context reveals that this conventional wisdom is
accepted by some courts and flatly rejected by others.110
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the interaction
between laches and statutes of limitations.111 In a case regarding the
Federal Farm Loan Act, the Court noted that a federal statute of
limitations is definitive.112 In a 1937 pre-merger decision, the Court
stated that “laches within a statute of limitations is no defense at law,”113
and the Court reaffirmed the statement in a 1985 decision.114 However,

Id. at 959. The equitable defenses of laches and unclean hands were available only in
equity before the merger. Id. The chancellors made some equitable defenses, such as
fraud, available at law by enjoining the opposing litigant from pursuing his claim. Id. See
also Heriot, supra note 11, at 926. As for statutes of limitations applying to equitable claims,
it is helpful to look to history. Id. The model for the first statutes of limitations adopted by
American legislatures was the Statute of James I passed by Parliament in 1623. Id. The
existence of equity courts is not acknowledged in the statute, and it is doubtful that
members of Parliament believed that statutes of limitations would ever cover matters in
equity. Id.
108
LAYCOCK, supra note 16, at 959.
109
Id. at 960. “The conventional wisdom is that unclean hands and laches are available
only if plaintiff seeks equitable relief. This conventional wisdom is not exactly false, but it
is misleading.” Id.; Robinson, supra note 86, at 970 (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S.
392, 395 (1946)). “If the cause of action is based upon a federally created right for which
Congress has provided a limitations period, the court will apply the congressionally
mandated limitation.” Robinson, supra note 86, at 973.
110
LAYCOCK, supra note 16, at 1003.
When an equitable claim is subject to a statute of limitations, laches is
irrelevant unless it bars the claim before the limitations period
expires. . . . It is rare to bar a claim for laches before an applicable
statute of limitations has run on a one–time event; some cases say it
just can’t happen.
Id.
111
Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463–64 (1947); Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 395; United States
v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489 (1935). “Laches within the term of the statute of limitations is no
defense at law.” Mack, 295 U.S. at 489; see also County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation,
470 U.S. 226, 244 n.16 (1985) (arguably reaffirming the pre-merger holding in Mack by
noting in dicta that “[a]pplication of the equitable defense of laches in an action at law
would be novel indeed”).
112
Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 395. The court noted in dicta that “[i]f Congress explicitly puts a
limit upon the time for enforcing a right which it created, there is an end of the matter. The
Congressional statute of limitation is definitive.” Id.
113
Mack, 295 U.S. at 489.
114
County of Oneida, 470 U.S. at 244 n.16.
107

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss2/4

Calwell: Can the Application of Laches Violate the Separation of Powers?:

2010]

Laches and the Separation of Powers

487

this guidance from the Court has not resolved the issue.115 Some circuits
in the copyright circuit split hold that laches may bar both legal and
equitable relief before the statute of limitations runs.116 Others maintain
that out of deference to the separation of powers, only equitable
remedies may be barred by laches, but never before the statute of
limitations runs.117 Still others hold that to bar either type of relief within
a federal statute of limitations would violate the separation of powers
doctrine.118
Copyright cases are not the only disputes concerning laches and
separation of powers principles.119 Cases outside the copyright context
stand for the proposition that allowing laches to shorten a statute of
limitations violates the separation of powers,120 while other courts
patently reject the idea. 121 Below is a discussion of decisions from inside
and outside the context of the Copyright Act that address the notion that
an application of laches could violate the separation of powers.122

LAYCOCK, supra note 16, at 1003 (noting the split of authority).
See infra Part II.C.
117
See infra Part II.C.
118
See infra Part II.C (discussing laches approaches both inside and outside the copyright
circuit split). The separation of powers concept is summarized by the Supreme Court:
While the Constitution of the United States divides all power conferred
upon the Federal Government into “legislative Powers,” Art. I, § 1,
“[t]he executive Power,” Art. II, § 1, and “[t]he judicial Power,” Art. III,
§ 1, it does not attempt to define those terms . . . . Obviously, then, the
Constitution’s central mechanism of separation of powers depends
largely upon common understanding of what activities are appropriate
to legislatures, to executives, and to courts. In The Federalist No. 48,
Madison expressed the view that “[i]t is not infrequently a question of
real nicety in legislative bodies whether the operation of a particular
measure will, or will not, extend beyond the legislative sphere,”
whereas “the executive power [is] restrained within a narrower
compass and . . . more simple in its nature,” and “the judiciary [is]
described by landmarks still less uncertain.”
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992).
119
See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the availability of laches in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)).
120
United States v. Rodriguez–Aguirre, 264 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2001) (criminal
proceeding); Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164 (8th Cir. 1995),
abrogated on other grounds by Madison v. IBP, Inc., 330 F.3d 1051, 1057 (8th Cir. 2003)
(reasoning that separation of powers principles prevent courts from shortening statutes of
limitations); Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813 (7th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that
laches is available because no express statute of limitations exists).
121
Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust of Ill. v. Gorman Bros. Ready Mix, 283 F.3d 877,
881 (7th Cir. 2002).
122
See infra Parts II.C.1–2.
115
116
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The Availability of Laches in Title VII, ADEA, and ERISA Cases

The Eighth Circuit has not addressed whether laches is available as
an affirmative defense in copyright claims filed within the federal statute
of limitations period, but the circuit has addressed the laches issue in the
context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Civil Rights Act”).123
In Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co., a female worker sued her
employer for gender and age discrimination.124 The court held that
laches should not bar a claim in an action with an express statute of
limitations established by Congress.125 Relying on a string of cases from
the Supreme Court and other federal circuits, the court held that laches
was not available within a statute of limitations and reasoned that
separation of powers principles mandated their conclusion.126
Similarly, the Second Circuit addressed the availability of laches as
an affirmative defense in the context of the Civil Rights Act.127 There, a
contracting company owned by Italian males challenged a state law
preferentially awarding contracts to businesses substantially owned by
minorities or females.128 The lower court held that laches barred
plaintiff’s claims, and the appellate court reversed.129 The Second Circuit
stated that the “prevailing rule” is that laches cannot bar a federal
statutory claim seeking legal relief where the action is filed within the
express statute of limitations.130 The court relied on separation of powers
concerns in reaching its ban on laches.131
Ashley, 66 F.3d 164. Abrogating Ashley, the court in Madison held that in a hostile
environment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff may recover for the entire period that the
hostile environment existed. Madison, 330 F.3d at 1057. This abrogated the rule in Ashley
that for continuing violations, the plaintiff could only recover for the two years prior to
filing the charge. Id.
124
66 F.3d at 166.
125
Id. at 169.
126
Id. at 168–70 (citing FDIC v. Fuller, 994 F.2d 223, 224 (5th Cir. 1993); Miller v.
Maxwell’s Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109 (1994);
United States v. RePass, 688 F.2d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 1982); Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 674
F.2d 379, 388 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds by 701 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1983)
(“[A]lthough the equitable part of a mixed [section 1983] claim can be barred by laches, the
legal part will be barred only by the statute of limitations . . . .”); Thropp v. Bache Halsey
Stuart Shields, Inc. 650 F.2d 817, 822 (6th Cir. 1981); Sun Oil Co. v. Fleming, 469 F.2d 211,
213–14 (10th Cir. 1972); Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1969); Straley v.
Universal Uranium & Milling Corp., 289 F.2d 370, 373 (9th Cir. 1961)).
127
Ivani Contracting Corp. v. City of New York, 103 F.3d 257 (2d Cir. 1997).
128
Id. at 258.
129
Id. at 262.
130
Id. at 260.
131
Id. “The prevailing rule, then, is that when a plaintiff brings a federal statutory claim
seeking legal relief, laches cannot bar that claim, at least where the statute contains an
express limitations period within which the action is timely.” Id.
123
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In the context of another federal law with an express statute of
limitations, the ADEA, the Ninth Circuit held that the doctrine of laches
is inapplicable when Congress provides a statute of limitations.132 There,
a female employee’s ADEA claims were barred by laches in the lower
court.133 The Ninth Circuit reversed and stated that the doctrine of
laches was unavailable because Congress explicitly provided a statute of
limitations to govern all ADEA actions.134
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit calls the argument that a court’s use
of laches might conflict with the separation of powers doctrine “odd.”135
In a case under ERISA, the court reasoned that just as equitable estoppel
and equitable tolling may lengthen a statute of limitations, laches may
operate to shorten it.136 Although ERISA does not have an express
statute of limitations, the court expanded its reasoning to cover federal
laws which do have express limits.137 The court noted further that laches
may operate to shorten a statute of limitations regardless of whether the
suit is at law or equity because the defense is available at law.138 This
dispute over the application of laches does not arise only in the context
of the Civil Rights Act, ADEA, and ERISA. It also extends to the heart of
the circuit split regarding laches and the Copyright Act.139

132
Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
1109 (1994)).
133
Id. at 584.
134
Id. at 586.
135
Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust of Ill. v. Gorman Bros. Ready Mix, 283 F.3d 877,
881 (7th Cir. 2002).
136
Id. at 881–82. “What is sauce for the goose (the plaintiff seeking to extend the statute
of limitations) is sauce for the gander (the defendant seeking to contract it).” Id. at 882.
Although ERISA does not have an express statute of limitations, the court addressed the
question of when laches could apply within the statute of limitations whether it was a
borrowed analogous state statute of limitations or an express one found in the statute itself.
Id. at 881.
For purposes of this appeal, therefore, it’s as if ERISA contained a (10year) statute of limitations; and this raised the question (not discussed
by the parties) when if ever laches can be used to shorten a statute of
limitations. It turns out that just as various tolling doctrines can be
used to lengthen the period for suit specified in a statute of limitations,
so laches can be used to contract it. . . . This is regardless of whether
the suit is at law or in equity, because, as with many equitable
defenses, the defense of laches is equally available in suits at law.
Id. (citing Hutchinson v. Spanierman, 190 F.3d 815, 823 (7th Cir. 1999); Hot Wax, Inc. v.
Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 822 (7th Cir. 1999); A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides
Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1029–30 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc)).
137
Id. at 881–82.
138
Id. at 881.
139
See infra Part II.B.2.
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The Availability of Laches in Copyright Cases

The Fourth Circuit relies on separation of powers principles to
completely bar the use of laches to shorten the statute of limitations
found in the Copyright Act.140 While the Fourth Circuit stands alone
with its complete ban on laches, it is not alone on the separation of
powers issue.141 The Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits allow laches to
restrict the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations in rare cases, but each
circuit agrees with the Fourth Circuit that doing so raises separation of
powers concerns.142 The Ninth stands alone as the only circuit that both
allows the application of laches to bar timely claims and excludes
separation of powers principles from the laches analysis.143
a.

Circuits Banning or Restricting Laches in Copyright Claims Based on
Separation of Powers Principles

In 2001, the Fourth Circuit ruled on a case involving Lyons
Partnership (“Lyons”), the owner of intellectual property rights in
Barney, a large purple dinosaur who appears in various products
marketed to children. 144 Lyons sued a costume shop for copyright
infringement. 145 Although four years passed between the moment the
plaintiff knew of the infringement and the time the claim was filed, the
court held that the action was not barred by the statute of limitations or
laches.146 The court reasoned that each new costume rental represented a
new infringement, so all costume rentals that took place during the three
140
Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2001). Specifically, the
court wrote:
[W]hen considering the timeliness of a cause of action brought
pursuant to a statute for which Congress has provided a limitations
period, a court should not apply laches to overrule the legislature’s
judgment as to the appropriate time limit to apply for actions brought
under the statute. Separation of powers principles thus preclude us
from applying the judicially created doctrine of laches to bar a federal
statutory claim that has been timely filed under an express statute of
limitations.
Id. at 798.
141
See infra Part II.C.2.a (discussing separation of powers analysis in Fourth, Sixth, Tenth
and Eleventh Circuit decisions).
142
See infra Part II.C.2.a.
143
See infra Part II.C.2.b (discussing separation of powers analysis in the Ninth Circuit).
144
Lyons P’ship, 243 F.3d at 794.
145
Id. at 795. Lyons claimed that three costumes being rented by the shop under names
such as “Hillary the Purple Hippopotamus,” and “Duffy the Dragon” looked like Barney
and lead children to believe the costumes were Barney. Id. at 795–96. The lawsuit also
included claims of trademark infringement. Id.
146
Id. at 797.
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years prior to the filing of the claim were not barred by the statute of
limitations.147 In regards to the laches claim, the Fourth Circuit held that
the equitable remedy could not bar the claim because separation of
powers principles prevented the courts from using equitable rules to bar
statutorily-timely claims.148 The court reasoned that using a judiciallycreated doctrine to override a legislative enactment would overstep the
court’s authority.149
In 2006, a United States District Court in North Carolina applied the
Fourth Circuit’s new ban on laches in a copyright infringement claim.150
In the 1970s and 1980s, the plaintiff received royalties for each episode of
the television series Dukes of Hazzard because the show was based on his
life and the lives of his family in Union County, North Carolina.151 Other
Dukes of Hazzard products were released in the 1980s, including two
made-for-television movies and a Saturday morning cartoon series.152
The plaintiff did not challenge the release of those products.153 On
August 5, 2005, Defendants released The Dukes of Hazzard feature film,
and Plaintiff filed his copyright infringement suit in November.154
Although the plaintiff was aware of Dukes of Hazzard products, such as
cartoons and television movies over twenty years before the feature film
release, the court applied the holding from Lyons and ruled that laches
was inapplicable in Fourth Circuit copyright infringement claims.155 The
statute of limitations period began to run anew with the feature film
release, and the plaintiff filed the claim well within the three-year period
allowed by statute.156

147
Id. The lower court erred when it ruled that multiple rentals of costumes all infringing
on the same copyrighted dinosaur character constituted one act of infringement. Id. The
court ruled that “each sale or rental should be considered separately under an infringement
analysis.” Id.
148
Id. The court also noted that laches does not apply to copyright infringement claims
because the doctrine only bars equitable actions and does not apply to actions at law. Id.
The court suggested that the separation of powers violation was the more overriding
concern. Id. The court wrote that even if laches could apply to legal actions, separation of
powers principles would still bar the doctrine from shortening federally mandated statutes
of limitations. Id.
149
Id. at 798.
150
Rushing v. Time Warner, Inc., No. 3:05CV474-H, 2006 WL 517674 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 1,
2006).
151
Id. at *1.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id. at *2.
156
Id.
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In 2002, the Tenth Circuit ruled on the issue.157 Plaintiff, Dr.
Jacobsen, a former prisoner of war in the Philippines and Japan during
World War II, wrote a memoir about his experiences.158 A writer by the
name of Dr. Hughes requested a meeting with Dr. Jacobsen in 1994.159
Dr. Hughes claimed he wanted to gather information about the war in
the Pacific for use in a series of fictional books and got a copy of Dr.
Jacobsen’s memoir.160 Dr. Jacobsen received a portion of Dr. Hughes’
new book in 1996, but claimed he did not see any infringing material at
that time.161 Dr. Jacobsen claimed he discovered the allegedly infringing
material when the book was published in 1997, and he filed suit in
1999.162 The district court held that laches barred Dr. Jacobsen’s claim
because he had an opportunity to let Dr. Hughes know of his
disapproval as early as 1994 and no later than 1996.163 The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.164 The court reasoned that
because Dr. Jacobsen filed his claim within three years of the publication
of Dr. Hughes’ book, the court should defer to the three-year statute of
limitations found in the Copyright Act.165 Whether Dr. Jacobsen knew of
the infringement prior to publication of the defendant’s book was in
dispute.166 The court relied on an earlier Tenth Circuit case, United States
v. Rodriguez-Aguirre,167 for the proposition that a statute of limitations
may be cut short by the doctrine of laches, but that it is only possible in

Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 940. Plaintiff, Dr. Jacobsen, writes about surviving a Bataan Death March and
years of imprisonment and torture in work camps. Id. He also describes his harrowing
journey to reach American troops after the war ended. Id. at 946. Dr. Jacobsen describes
boarding a ship in an attempt to leave Japan:
Approaching the sailors the second time, one of the fellows drove his
souvenir sword into the deck of the ship and said somewhat fiercely,
“Listen you guys! General MacArthur said that we had the authority to
use any means of transportation necessary to get out of Japan, and this
boat is necessary for us to reach American troops. We are going to get
across this bay with you or without you. If you want to take us across and
get paid for your troubles, fine. If you don’t get off the ship, and we’ll take
ourselves across!”
Id.
159
Id. at 949.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 949–50.
162
Id. at 940.
163
Id. at 949.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 950.
166
Id. at 949. Further, the district court erred when it made a factual determination
regarding laches. Id.
167
264 F.3d 1195, 1207-08 (10th Cir. 2001).
157
158
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rare cases.168 The court reasoned that the separation of powers doctrine
constrained its ability to use a judicially-created equitable defense to
truncate a legislative enactment, and where possible, the court should
defer to the express limitations period.169
In 2007, the Sixth Circuit ruled on the issue.170 Although the court
did not go so far as to bar the availability of laches in a statutorily-timely
claim, the court severely restricted the use of the doctrine and discussed
separation of powers concerns.171 In Chirco v. Crosswinds Communities,
Inc., plaintiffs sought destruction of a condominium complex that
allegedly infringed on their copyrighted design.172 While destruction of
copies is a remedy available under the Copyright Act173 and plaintiffs
filed their claim two and a half years after discovering the infringement,
the court declined to allow destruction of the buildings.174 After a
lengthy review of cases on equity and the separation of powers, the court
held that laches may bar relief that would work an unjust hardship upon
the defendants or upon innocent third parties.175 However, claims filed
within the statute of limitations are afforded a presumption that the
plaintiff’s delay in bringing the suit is reasonable.176 Ultimately, the
court awarded monetary damages and injunctive relief.177
Id. at 951.
Id. The separation of powers doctrine was central to the court’s reasoning. Id. In
deciding that Dr Jacobsen’s case was simply not one of the rare situations that could justify
shortening Congress’s express time limitation, the court looked to the Fourth Circuit for
guidance. Id. The court noted that the Fourth Circuit held that “separation of powers
principles dictate that an equitable timeliness rule adopted by courts cannot bar claims that
are brought within the legislatively prescribed statute of limitations” in the Copyright Act.
Id. The court also relied on authority from a prior Tenth Circuit case noting:
Because laches is a judicially created equitable doctrine, whereas
statutes of limitations are legislative enactments, it has been observed
that in deference to the doctrine of the separation of powers, the
Supreme Court has been circumspect in adopting principles of equity
in the context of enforcing federal statutes. Accordingly, when a
limitation on the period for bringing suit has been set by statute, laches
will generally not be invoked to shorten the statutory period.
Id.
170
Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys. Inc., 474 F.3d 227 (6th Cir. 2007).
171
Id. at 232–33.
172
Id. at 229.
173
17 U.S.C. § 503 (2006).
174
Chirco, 474 F.3d at 236.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 233. The court reasoned that several reasons justified using the statutory period
as the laches period. Id. The court wrote:
It enhances the stability and clarity of the law by applying neutral
rules and principles in an evenhanded fashion rather than making the
question purely discretionary. It also requires courts to make clear
distinctions between threshold or special defenses or pleas in bar and
168
169
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In July of 2008, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of laches in
copyright claims.178 The case concerned a dispute over the Church of
Scientology’s use of a former member’s marketing book.179 Citing
separation of powers concerns, the court held that laches may only be
applied to statutorily-timely claims in extraordinary circumstances, and
even then, only to bar retrospective damages.180 The court noted that it
was “mindful” of separation of powers principles and held there is a
strong presumption that a plaintiff’s suit is timely if filed before the
statute of limitations expires.181
b.

Ninth Circuit: Separation of Powers Doctrine Does Not Affect Laches
Analysis in Copyright Claims

Five months after the Fourth Circuit held that applying laches to a
statutorily-timely claim violates the separation of powers doctrine, the
Ninth Circuit disagreed.182 In August of 2001, the Ninth Circuit ruled on
the availability of laches as an affirmative defense in copyright claims
filed before the limitations period expires.183 In a case concerning rights
to the famous James Bond character, the court held that laches barred the
claim in its entirety, including prospective injunctions for future
infringement.184 Key to the court’s reasoning was the fact that the
the merits of the case. It enhances the rationality and objectivity of the
process by preventing courts from short circuiting difficult issues on
the merits by confusing or conflating the merits of an action with other
defenses.
Id. (citing Tandy Corp. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 769 F.2d 362, 365 (6th Cir. 1985).
177
Id. at 236.
178
Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287
(11th Cir. 2008).
179
Id. at 1293. For a thorough summary and commentary on Letterese, see Brittany
Adkins, Eleventh Circuit: Survey of Recent Decisions, Defense of Laches in Copyright
Infringement ActionPeter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters.,
Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008), 39 CUMB. L. REV. 819, 855 (2008–2009).
180
Id. at 1321.
181
Id. at 1320.
182
Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 955 (9th Cir. 2001).
183
Id.
184
Id. at 959. The opinion mimics the tone of the James Bond films and uses quotes from
the movies to symbolize the competing views of laches. Id. at 947. The opinion begins with
the epitaph for Mrs. Bond, “We have all the time in the world,” and a quote from the Bond
Film, “Equity aids the vigilant.” Id. at 946–47. Further, to demonstrate that the case at bar
was one of the extraordinary cases that called for a complete bar by the doctrine of laches,
the court characterizes the legal battle in terms of spy drama. Id. at 947. The court states:
Every so often, the law shakes off its cobwebs to produce a story
far too improbable even for the silver screen—too fabulous even for
the world of Agent 007. This is one of those occasions, for the case
before us has it all. A hero, seeking to redeem his stolen fortune. The
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alleged infringements on the James Bond character involved movie
releases and DVD re-releases over many years.185 The court reasoned
that because the infringements had occurred over a lengthy period of
time and were so similar in nature, they should be treated as one
infringement for the purposes of laches analysis.186 The court barred the
entire claim and did not include any mention of the separation of powers
doctrine in the opinion.187
With one circuit holding that laches may bar a statutorily-timely
claim in its entirety,188 one circuit banning laches in timely claims due to
a separation of powers violation,189 and two others limiting the use of
laches,190 the circuit split presents a widening dilemma. If the James
Bond case occurred in the Fourth Circuit where laches is unavailable to
bar relief within three years of an infringement, the plaintiff might have
prevailed and won an injunction to halt the DVD re-release.191 Congress
intended to eliminate differing time limitations on claims when they

villainous organization that stands in his way. Mystery! International
intrigue! And now, not least of all, the dusty corners of the ancient law
of equity.
More specifically, this case arises out of an almost forty–year
dispute over the parentage and ownership of a cultural phenomenon:
Bond. James Bond. We are confronted with two competing narratives,
with little in common but their endpoint. All agree that James Bond—
the roguish British secret agent known for martinis (shaken, not
stirred), narrow escapes, and a fondness for fetching paramours with
risqué sobriquets—is one of the great commercial successes of the
modern cinema. The parties dispute, however, the source from which
Agent 007 sprang.
Id.
185
186

Id. at 954.
Id. The court explained:
The perfect overlap between the alleged infringements in the DVD rereleases and the original movies requires us to treat them the same for
purposes of laches, regardless of the statute of limitations. . . . Here, it
has simply been alleged that DVDs “and other new media” contain the
same infringing elements as the movies that they reproduce. In this
situation, the new medium and the old should be treated as one.

Id.
Id. at 942. Separation of powers principles are not mentioned anywhere in the
opinion.
188
Id. at 955.
189
Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001).
190
Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys. Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 236 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that laches
may bar relief within statutory period when relief sought will create an unjust hardship
upon the defendants or upon innocent third parties); Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v.
World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1320 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that laches
may bar only retrospective damages in extraordinary circumstances).
191
See Lyons P’ship, 243 F.3d at 798.
187
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placed a statute of limitations in the Copyright Act.192 Without a
resolution, the circuit split threatens to destroy the uniformity that the
statute of limitations was enacted to create.193
III. ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL RESOLUTIONS TO THE COPYRIGHT CIRCUIT
SPLIT
Congress placed a three-year statute of limitations in the Copyright
Act to prevent forum shopping and create uniformity in the courts.194
The statute of limitations provision has failed to bring about the
uniformity that both Congress and the Framers of the Constitution
intended.195 To establish more uniform time limitations in the context of
copyright claims, Congress needs to amend the Copyright Act, and this
Note offers a combination of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits’ approaches
that would best resolve the circuit split.196 First, Part III of this Note will
analyze three possible amendments to the Copyright Act.197 Part III.A
will analyze an amendment codifying the approach taken by the Fourth
Circuit to completely bar the use of laches in timely copyright claims.198
Part III.B will analyze an amendment codifying the approach taken by
the Sixth Circuit to afford a presumption of timeliness to claims filed
within the statutory period and permit the defense of laches when relief
would work an unjust hardship on the defendants or innocent third
parties.199 Part III.C will analyze an amendment codifying the approach
taken by the Ninth Circuit allowing laches to bar both past and
prospective relief in cases of similar infringements.200

192
See supra note 58 and accompanying text discussing Congress’s intent to create
uniformity and eliminate forum shopping by enacting a three-year statute of limitations in
the Copyright Act.
193
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
194
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
195
See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the conflicting approaches taken to time limitations in
copyright cases).
196
See infra Part IV for the author’s proposed amendment.
197
See infra Parts III.A–C (analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the three
approaches taken in the copyright circuit split).
198
See infra Part III.A.
199
See infra Part III.B.
200
See infra Part III.C.
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A. The Fourth Circuit’s Approach: A Flat Ban on Laches within the Statutory
Period
The Fourth Circuit took the approach of banning the defense of
laches.201 Codifying the Copyright Act to reflect a ban on the equitable
defense of laches within the statutory period would create uniformity,
but the court’s reasoning regarding the separation of powers is flawed
and would overly restrict the equitable powers of the court.202
First, the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning regarding laches and the
separation of powers is flawed.203 The court reasoned that Congress
intended copyright plaintiffs to have three years to file suit for each
infringement and to allow anything less would be acting contrary to
congressional intent.204 However, amending the Copyright Act to bar
laches would eliminate an invaluable tool that aids the courts in carrying
out the will of Congress.205 With repeated violations of similar copyright
infringements, laches is especially helpful in carrying out Congress’s
intent to limit copyright claims.206 Without laches in cases of continuing
201
See supra Part II.C.2.a (discussing the facts, holding, and reasoning of the Fourth
Circuit’s decision).
202
See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text (discussing the certainty and
predictability provided by statutes of limitations). The Sixth Circuit criticized the Fourth
Circuit’s ban on laches within the statute of limitations. Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys. Inc.,
474 F.3d 227, 232–33 (6th Cir. 2007). The court wrote “[W]e conclude that a flat proscription
such as that invoked by the Fourth Circuit against the defense of laches in cases involving a
federal statutory claim is both unnecessary and unwise.” Id. at 233–34.
203
See supra Part II.C.2.a for a discussion of the reasoning each circuit uses in laches
analysis.
204
Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2001). Specifically,
the court wrote that “because laches is a judicially created doctrine, whereas statutes of
limitations are legislative enactments, it has been observed that ‘[i]n deference to the
doctrine of separation of powers, the [Supreme] Court has been circumspect in adopting
principles of equity in the context of enforcing federal statutes.’” Id. at 789 (citing County
of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 244 n.16 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part)).
205
See CAMPBELL, supra note 12 (arguing that courts’ equitable powers can actually
provide a method for resolving separation of powers issues and aid the court in
conforming a statute to different factual scenarios).
206
The Ninth Circuit case in the copyright circuit split concerned a long series of
copyright infringements, and the court rightly decided that even though technically the
statute of limitations had not run, the plaintiff had impermissibly delayed in bringing suit.
Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 950 (9th Cir. 2001). The court described the
extremely long time lapse:
On the substance of the laches issue, the court concluded that
McClory had known of the alleged infringement since at least
1961, and that his only suit to enforce any rights against Danjaq
was the 1976 litigation, which was unrelated to the claims
presented here. Thus, there had been a delay of at least twentyone years—and more likely, thirty-six years—between
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copyright violations, courts would be forced to allow a result that
Congress surely did not intend—a plaintiff could wait for twenty years
while her design is repeatedly copied only to bring suit once the
infringements became profitable.207 This scenario represents exactly the
type of impermissible speculation with other’s money that Judge
Learned Hand warned against.208
Further, one traditional understanding of laches is that the defense
may operate independently of a statute of limitations with the ability to
cut it short.209 While the Supreme Court has recognized that an exercise
of equitable powers could violate the separation of powers doctrine,
using laches to tailor just relief in extraordinary circumstances does not
constitute the type of judicial power grab the Court has warned
against.210 A separation of powers issue could possibly be a concern if a
court allowed laches to bar both legal and equitable relief in the case of a

McClory’s knowledge of the potential claims and the initiation
of litigation.
Id.
See supra Part II.A (discussing Congress’s intent to limit the amount of time a plaintiff
has to file a copyright claim).
208
See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Learned Hand’s famous
characterization of delay in a copyright infringement case as speculation without risk).
209
See supra note 7 (discussing Judge Posner’s view that laches may shorten statutes of
limitations just as equitable tolling doctrines can lengthen the time for a claim to be filed).
Contra DOBBS, supra note 1, at 103. Dobbs writes that the “traditional function suggests that
laches should be limited to cases in which no statute of limitations applies.” Id.
210
See supra note 8 (discussing Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131–32 (1995) in which he states that separation of powers principles
are a restraint on the courts’ equitable powers). Although Justice Thomas recognizes that a
court could use equitable powers in such a way as to violate the separation of powers
doctrine, he does so in an extreme case. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131–32 (1995).
In Jenkins, the Court addressed a situation in which a district court retained jurisdiction and
became too involved in supervising a school desegregation plan. Id. at 74–75. The Court
held that the district court overstepped its authority when fashioning a remedy for past
legally-mandated segregation. Id. at 87–88. The district court ordered salary increases for
teachers which was “grounded in remedying the vestiges of segregation by improving the
desegregative attractiveness” of the school district. Id. at 80. Justice Thomas suggested the
court breached the doctrine of federalism when it started “running school systems.” Id. at
132–33. The example he gave of a court potentially using its equitable powers in violation
of the separation of powers doctrine was a court “running Executive Branch agencies.” Id.
at 133. The extreme examples Thomas used of a court overstepping its authority are easily
distinguishable from a situation in which a court uses laches to refuse the extraordinary
relief of destroying a building as it did in the Sixth Circuit. See id. The example of a court
running a school is also easily distinguishable and much less drastic than a court using
laches to refuse relief in a situation in which a copyright infringement has gone on for
decades. Id.
207
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one-time infringement that was also absent compelling circumstances.211
This is a rare event and has yet to occur in the copyright circuit split
cases.212 In the context of the copyright circuit split, each time laches
shortened a statute of limitations, it only barred extraordinary legal relief
or, in the case of continuing copyright infringements that occurred over
the span of thirty years, barred all relief.213 To quote the Sixth Circuit,
the Fourth Circuit’s flat ban on laches within the statutory period is
“unnecessary and unwise.”214
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Approach: A Presumption of Timeliness
Another possible resolution to the copyright circuit split is to amend
the Copyright Act and codify the Sixth Circuit’s approach.215 The
approach taken by the Sixth Circuit is to allow laches within the
statutory period in unusual circumstances, but to create a presumption
that the defense does not apply if the claim is filed before the limitations
period ends.216 The main justification for this approach is that it offers a
balance between the competing objectives of deferring to Congress’s
power to set strict time limitations while also deferring to courts’
traditional equitable powers, which rely on flexibility to tailor fair
results.217 Out of deference to the separation of powers, the court in
Chirco allowed laches to bar only equitable relief that would work an
unjust hardship on the defendant.218 By declining to apply laches to the
211
LAYCOCK, supra note 16, at 1003 (explaining that it is “rare” for laches to bar a claim
before a statute of limitations has run on a one-time event and noting that some cases stand
for the proposition that laches is not allowed before the time has expired).
212
Supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the fact patterns of cases from all circuits in the copyright
circuit split).
213
The Sixth Circuit allowed laches to bar the equitable remedy of impounding the
infringing building. Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys. Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 231 (6th Cir. 2007).
The Ninth Circuit allowed laches to bar both legal and equitable relief in the case of
copyright infringements that had occurred over many years. Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp.,
263 F.3d 942, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2001).
214
Chirco, 474 F.3d at 234.
215
See supra notes 170–77 and accompanying text (discussing the Sixth Circuit approach
to laches in copyright claims).
216
See supra notes 170–77 and accompanying text. In the Sixth Circuit there is a
presumption that the plaintiff’s delay in filing suit was reasonable for the purposes of
laches analysis if the claim is filed before the statute of limitations expires. Chirco, 474 F.3d
at 229.
217
Chirco, 474 F.3d at 232–33. The Sixth Circuit justifies its approach by claiming that it
has “carved out a middle ground between the Fourth Circuit’s strict prohibition on
application of the laches doctrine in cases involving a statute with an explicit limitations
provision and the somewhat more expansive application of the doctrine by the Ninth
Circuit.” Id.
218
Id.
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entire claim, the Sixth Circuit’s approach gives deference to the Supreme
Court’s admonishment that “laches within the term of the statute of
limitations is no defense at law.”219 However, the Sixth Circuit’s
approach may reward plaintiffs who delay in cases of continuing
infringements.220
Codifying the Sixth Circuit’s approach is not an acceptable
resolution to the circuit split because in the case of continuing
infringements, it works against the policy objective of copyright law that
plaintiffs should not be able to speculate without risk.221 A codification
of the Sixth Circuit’s approach would provide a presumption of
timeliness for all claims filed within the statute of limitations.222 The
court would presume any delay the plaintiff had in filing the claim was
reasonable as long as the claim was filed within three years of an
infringement, regardless of the similarity of past infringements.223
Applying this reasoning to a continuing infringement produces an unjust
result.224 If the facts of Chirco had been that the alleged infringers had
built condominiums from copyrighted plans each year for ten years and
were sued in the eleventh year, the plaintiff would still have benefitted
from the presumption of timeliness.225 With each new building
representing a new infringement and therefore starting the statute of
limitations clock anew, the plaintiff’s claim would be timely and the
defendants would have the burden of overcoming the presumption that
the plaintiff’s delay was reasonable despite the fact that he had
knowledge of the infringing conduct for eleven years.226 This type of

United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489 (1935).
See supra notes 123–26 (discussing Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d
164 (8th Cir. 1995) where laches did not bar a claim for a harm that had been continuing
over the course of many years).
221
See supra note 99 and accompanying text (quoting Judge Learned Hand’s comments
that it is impermissible for a plaintiff to delay in order to capitalize on an infringer’s labor).
222
Chirco, 474 F.3d at 229. The court noted the Sixth Circuit presumption in its holding:
To the extent that the plaintiffs in this case are seeking only monetary
damages and injunctive relief, we give effect to the Sixth Circuit’s
presumption that the statute of limitations must prevail. However, to
the extent that the relief sought is destruction of the condominium
complex that allegedly infringes the plaintiffs’ copyright, the facts
before us suggest that this is indeed the extraordinary case in which
the defense of laches is properly interposed.
Id.
223
Id.
224
See infra text accompanying notes 254–60 (arguing that continuing infringements raise
special concerns about a plaintiff’s delay in filing suit).
225
See Chirco, 474 F.3d at 229.
226
See id.
219
220
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delay in bringing suit is exactly the type of delay laches guards
against.227
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Approach: Liberal Laches Application
Another possible amendment to the Copyright Act would be a
codification of the Ninth Circuit’s approach that laches is allowed to bar
an entire claim within the statute of limitations and include a distinction
regarding continuing infringements that are similar in nature.228 The
main justification for this approach is that courts are free to use their
equitable powers to shape relief, and a separation of powers violation is
not a concern, especially in the context of continuing infringements.229
The Ninth Circuit reasons that allowing laches to bar a claim that
involves substantially similar infringements over the span of thirty-six
years does not frustrate Congress’s intent to allow copyright plaintiffs
three years to file a claim and could not possibly present a conflict with
the separation of powers doctrine.230
A distinction regarding continuing infringements is crucial to an
amendment of the Copyright Act. While laches should be allowed in
copyright claims, simply clarifying this in the Act does not do enough to
resolve the split. The primary goal of amending the Copyright Act is to
establish uniformity in copyright decisions, which was the intent of both
the Framers of the Constitution and the Congress that placed the statute
of limitations in the Act.231 The traditional understanding of courts’
equitable powers supports the notion that laches may shorten a statute of
limitations, but simply acknowledging this power in the Act misses an
opportunity to provide courts with more specific standards to apply to
claims.232 An amendment to the Act should provide a workable, uniform
standard so that the incentive system found in the copyright clause of
the Constitution will continue to encourage the production of creative
works.233

227
See supra note 99 (citing Judge Learned Hand’s description of one of the perils of
laches in a copyright claim that plaintiffs may speculate without risk).
228
Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 960 (9th Cir. 2001).
229
See id. Separation of powers principles are not mentioned anywhere in the opinion.
Id.
230
Id.
231
See supra Part II.A (discussing the history and purpose of the Copyright Act).
232
See supra note 7 (discussing Posner’s explanation of laches in Teamsters & Employers
Welfare Trust of Ill. v. Gorman Bros. Ready Mix, 283 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2002)).
233
See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text (discussing the policy objectives of
Copyright Law and the incentive system built into the Constitution to continually
encourage the production of creative works).
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Further, a distinction regarding continuing infringements supports
the policy objectives of the Copyright Act. 234 The distinction further
clarifies when an entire claim could be barred within the limitations
period, and the clarification guards against any chilling effect the
amendment may have on the production or use of creative works.235 If
authors believe that the courts powers are too broad and that courts have
too much discretion when deciding to bar an entire claim within the
three-year period, a distrust of copyright protection may arise.236 An
unintended consequence might be a resurgence of the kind of mistrust of
equitable remedies that the 1938 merger of law and equity in America
was intended to quell.237
Below, Part IV presents an amendment to the Copyright Act that
combines the Ninth and Sixth Circuits’ approaches and provides a
resolution to the circuit split that gives deference to the separation of
powers doctrine, preserves courts’ traditional equitable powers, and
furthers the goals of the copyright clause.238
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT
Although trying to create a rigid rule for the application of the
equitable defense of laches is like trying to tailor a tuxedo that would fit
every man in America, a rule regarding the defense is needed in the

See supra Part II.A (discussing the policy objectives of the Copyright Act).
See supra Part II.A. See also supra note 16 (discussing due process concerns that arise
when a plaintiff cannot rely on the statute of limitations to inform her of the time limits that
apply to her cause of action). A reasonable inference from the notion that time limits on
suing to protect one’s copyright are flexible and to some extent unknowable is that the
uncertainty will stifle the creation of artistic works. The strong protection the United States
affords to copyrightable works is designed to assure creators they will reap the rewards of
their labor. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text (discussing the incentives in
copyright law).
236
See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing the distrust of equity courts in
America pre-merger).
237
See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 115–16, n.1. In a discussion of the role of equitable
discretion in equity and in modern courts, Dobbs notes that Americans do not think of
themselves as a people governed by “unknown and unknowable” laws. Id. Dobbs notes
that equitable discretion cannot be applied even–handedly to all suitors. Id.
The first principle of due process embraces a rule of law which
contains standards that can be known in advance, conformed to, and
applied rationally. The doctrine of the supremacy of law is “a doctrine
that the sovereign and all its agencies are bound to act upon principles,
not according to arbitrary will; are obliged to follow reason instead of
being free to follow caprice.”
Id. (citing Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting ROSCOE
POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 183 (1963) (1921))).
238
See infra text accompanying note 241 for the author’s proposed amendment.
234
235
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Copyright Act to assure stability and uniformity in copyright decisions.
An amendment to the Copyright Act is needed to resolve the circuit split
effectively. Codifying the approach of the Fourth, Sixth, or Ninth
Circuits alone is an inadequate resolution.239 This Note presents an
amendment to the Copyright Act that borrows the Ninth Circuit’s
distinction regarding substantially similar infringements and the Sixth
Circuit’s presumption of timeliness.240
A. Congress Should Amend 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) as Follows:
§ 507.

Limitations on actions

(b) Civil Actions. No civil action shall be maintained
under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced
within three years after the claim accrued. Traditional
equitable defenses are available within this period, but a
presumption of reasonable delay will be afforded to claims filed
within three years of the infringement. However, in cases of
substantially similar, repetitive infringements, no such
presumption of reasonable delay will be afforded to claims filed
more than three years from plaintiff’s first discovery of
infringement.241
This amendment effectively resolves the circuit split by offering a
more concrete guideline for courts, promoting the policy objectives of
copyright law, and resolving separation of powers concerns.242 First, a
presumption of timeliness provides a workable standard that promotes
uniformity and furthers the policy objectives of the Act.243 The statute of
limitations in the Act gives a plaintiff notice that she has three years to
file her copyright claim.244 Although her claim may be entirely barred by
laches within the limitations period if it represents a compelling case that
will work an unjust hardship on the defendant, the presumption of
timeliness safeguards the time she has to file.245 Without a presumption

See supra Part III (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of codifying the different
circuits’ approaches to the availability of laches in copyright claims).
240
See infra text accompanying note 241 for the author’s proposed amendment.
241
17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2006).
The italicized language represents the proposed
amendments from the author.
242
See supra Part II.A (discussing the policy objectives of the Copyright Act).
243
See supra Part II.A.
244
See supra note 16 (discussing due process concerns that arise when a plaintiff cannot
rely on the statute of limitations to inform her of the time limits that apply to her cause of
action).
245
See Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007).
239
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in the statute that the delay is reasonable, laches could function to bar
both legal and equitable relief without any procedural safeguard for the
limitations period.246 By placing the burden of proof on the defendant,
shortening a plaintiff’s time to file a claim becomes more difficult.247 The
uncertainty that may result from explicitly recognizing the courts’ ability
to use equitable powers within the statute of limitations is balanced by
the procedural safeguard that will provide assurance to copyright
holders.248
Second, allowing laches within the statute of limitations period
enables courts to render fair results which can only encourage the
production of creative works.249 Restricting courts’ equitable powers by
banning laches within the statutory period may force unjust results that
are contrary to the intentions Congress expressed in the Copyright
Act.250 However, acknowledging the availability of laches within the
statutory period with no procedural safeguard or other limitation will
not provide uniformity and may chill the production and use of creative
works.251 If authors understand that cases will not be subject to strict
rules which might mandate unjust consequences, incentives to put
creative work into the marketplace will remain.252 Similarly, the
incentive to produce creative works remains viable if authors
understand that judges do not have unlimited discretion to shorten
statutory periods.253
Limiting the presumption of reasonable delay in cases of continuing
infringements guards against the type of risk-free speculation that Judge
Learned Hand warned against.254 Continuing infringements, such as
those that occurred in Danjaq, are most likely to allow plaintiffs to
impermissibly delay and only file suit when the infringer’s efforts have
become profitable.255 In jurisdictions that use an injury rule for the
tolling of the statute of limitations, repetitive infringement of a copyright

246
See id. at 229. The Sixth Circuit offers the presumption as a procedural safeguard as a
restraint on its equitable powers. Id.
247
Id.
248
See supra Part IV (outlining proposed amendment).
249
See supra Part II.A.
250
See supra Part III.A (analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of a complete ban on
laches).
251
See supra note 235 (discussing the potential chilling effect of uncertain time
limitations).
252
See supra note 235.
253
See supra Part II.B (discussing the history of laches and the discretion used in courts of
equity).
254
See supra note 99.
255
Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 960 (9th Cir. 2001).
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could extend the time to file indefinitely.256 For example, in Lyons,
Plaintiff sued the costume shop for renting costumes that allegedly
infringed on his copyright of Barney the purple dinosaur.257 Despite the
fact that Plaintiff filed his claim four years after he knew of the first
costume rental, the court ruled that the statute of limitations period had
not run on any rentals that occurred within the last three years.258
Following the reasoning in Lyons, plaintiff could passively watch as the
costume shop rented allegedly-infringing costumes for twenty years and
choose to sue in the twenty-first year when the costumes became
extremely popular and profitable.259 A plaintiff who waits to sue for
more than three years in the case of a continuing infringement should
not get the benefit of a presumption of reasonable delay.260
Amending the copyright act to reflect the availability of laches with a
limited presumption of timeliness resolves separation of powers
concerns for two reasons. First, Congress amends the Act, thereby
clarifying its intentions with regard to the amount of time plaintiffs have
to file a copyright claim.261 Congress can also make its intentions clear as
to how equitable defenses or remedies should operate in these claims.262
As a result, courts would have more guidance as to how long a plaintiff
has to file and in what circumstances, and would direct courts to
promulgate congressional intent.263 Second, the proposed amendment
offers an approach that achieves a balance between the power of
Congress and the power of the courts. The amendment explicitly
recognizes courts’ equitable powers to determine reasonable and
unreasonable delays, yet places a limit on the ability to do so.264 The
amendment provides for a strict three-year statute of limitations to
prevent forum shopping and create uniform guidelines, yet recognizes

256
See supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text (discussing the injury rule and
continuing wrongs).
257
Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001).
258
Id.
259
See id.
260
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
261
See supra notes 62–68 (discussing how the varying methods courts use to calculate
when a claim accrues has frustrated Congress’s intent to create uniformity in the Act
through a statute of limitations).
262
See supra text accompanying note 241 for author’s proposed amendments to the
Copyright Act.
263
See supra text accompanying note 241 for author’s proposed amendments to the
Copyright Act.
264
See supra text accompanying note 241 for author’s proposed amendments to the
Copyright Act.
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that rigid rules may need to be changed to fit extraordinary
circumstances.265
Finally, an amendment is necessary because either the cases in the
split have not been appealed to the Supreme Court, or the Court has
refused certiorari.266 As for areas of the law outside the copyright
context, the Supreme Court needs to revisit the issue of laches in suits
with explicit statutes of limitations and provide guidance in this
“murky” area of the law.267 Courts are clearly confused and conflicted
regarding their equitable powers in the face of congressionallymandated statutes of limitations.268 The Supreme Court needs to
establish whether laches may apply to both legal and equitable causes of
action and remedies or if the old distinction remains.269 The Court needs
to address how continuing wrong, rolling statutes of limitations,
discovery rules, and injury rules affect the application of laches.270 A
Congressional amendment to the Copyright Act regarding the statute of
limitations would aid those in copyright litigation but leave the issue
unresolved for the vast array of other plaintiffs suing under federal
statutes that contain time limitations.
V. CONCLUSION
There is a divide both inside and outside the context of the
Copyright Act about whether laches may operate to cut short an explicit
federal statute of limitations without violating separation of powers
principles. This confusion in the courts goes to fundamental questions
about the nature of statutes of limitations and the traditional equitable
powers of the courts. In the copyright context, the results vary from
circuit to circuit, and outside the copyright context, the answer is no
See supra note 36 (listing cases that recognize the use of laches in cases with
extraordinary circumstances).
266
Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001) (not appealed
to the Supreme Court); Chirco v. Crosswinds Cmtys. Inc., 474 F.3d 227 (6th Cir. 2007), cert
denied, 551 U.S. 1131 (2007); Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2001) (not
appealed to the Supreme Court); Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936 (10th Cir.
2002), cert denied, 537 U.S. 1066 (2002); Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of
Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008) (not appealed to the Supreme Court).
267
Laycock acknowledges that this area of the law remains “murky.” LAYCOCK, supra
note 16, at 7–8. “Where the law/equity distinction is especially murky, . . . lawyers and
judges tend to overlook it, and the distinction becomes less and less important.” Id.
268
See supra Part.II.C.2 (discussing the approach taken by cases in the copyright circuit
split).
269
See supra note 267 (discussing the distinction between law and equity).
270
See supra notes 62–68 (discussing how the varying methods courts use to calculate
when a claim accrues has frustrated Congress’s intent to create uniformity in the Act
through a statute of limitations).
265
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clearer with some courts denying themselves the power to cut short
explicit federal statutes of limitations and others freely doing so.
The copyright circuit split demonstrates that the judiciary is
uncertain about the role of laches in cases with express statutes of
limitations. Judge Posner dismisses the argument that laches could
violate separation of powers principles as “odd.”271 Yet, other sources
proclaim that “laches is irrelevant” in a suit with a statute of
limitations.272 Textbooks give a fleeting reference to a line of cases which
stand for the proposition that laches can never operate to shorten a
statute of limitations.273 The Supreme Court states that the application of
laches to an action at law would be “novel.”274 Further, the Court has
cautioned against the application of equitable principles to
Congressional mandates.275
The debate regarding laches and separation of powers principles is
problematic. The Supreme Court needs to address the issue to provide
clarity for all areas of the law, and an amendment to the Copyright Act is
needed to resolve cases in the copyright context. Codifying the approach
of the Fourth, Sixth, or Ninth Circuits alone would provide an
inadequate resolution. Amending the Copyright Act to reflect the
availability of laches within the statute of limitations, but provide a
limiting presumption of timeliness in cases that do not involve
continuing infringements offers the best solution. The proposed
amendment effectively resolves the circuit split by offering concrete
guidance for courts, promoting the policy objectives of copyright law,
and resolving separation of powers concerns.
Emily A. Calwell∗
271
Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust of Ill. v. Gorman Bros. Ready Mix, 283 F.3d 877,
881 (7th Cir. 2002).
272
See LAYCOCK, supra note 16, at 1003.
273
Id.
274
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 244 n.16 (1985) (noting in
dicta that the application of laches in an action at law would be “novel”).
275
See supra note 8 (discussing the Supreme Court’s admonishment in Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131–32 (1995) that the separation of powers is a restraint on a court’s
equity powers).
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